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Abstract:  Geographers are increasingly interested in understanding the significance of 
developments in neuroscience, psychology and the behavioural sciences.  Indeed, 
consideration of these disciplines has arguably shaped the trajectories of human geography 
since at least the 1960s, but its ‘neural turn’ has only recently been acknowledged.   This 
paper provides an original analysis of the intersections of research on neuroscience and 
geography. With reference to qualitative interviews with cognitive scientists and 
neuroscientists based in the UK, it identifies how geographical concepts have been 
approached within contemporary neuroscience while also identifying the broad trajectories 
of geographers’ engagements with neuroscience. The discussion demonstrates the political 
implications of these disciplinary trends for a geographical account of brain culture and 
brain-based explanations in policy and practice.  Specifically it proposes the development of 
a ‘critical neuro-geography’ capable of providing an overarching analysis of these 
phenomena. The paper’s novel synthesis of hitherto disconnected engagements between 
geography, cognitive science and neuroscience establishes the rationale for a more 
sustained and critical engagement between neuroscience and geography sensitive to issues 
of situated subjectivity, power, inequality and difference. 
Keywords: Neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, geographical thought, embodied 
cognition, subjectivity  
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Geography and Neuroscience: critical engagements with geography’s ‘neural turn’  
Introduction: mind, brain and world 
Geographers have a long running interest in cognition or mental processes and on 
explaining the relationship between the mind (primarily perception, memory, consciousness 
and behavioural prompts) and the world (environment, landscape or context).  More 
recently they have discussed the brain itself and its affective interactions with the world 
(McCormack, 2007; Thrift 2008; Callard and Papoulias, 2010; Davies, 2010; Gagen, 2015; 
Pykett, 2015). From their early explorations of psychology, geographers have consistently 
resisted the internalisation of the mind. As David Ley noted in 1978, the mind is not 
reducible to the organ of the brain (p45, cited in Pile, 1993: p125): 
“…the environment is not in the head. Consciousness cannot break loose from a 
concrete time-space context, from the realities of everyday living; notions of pure 
consciousness are as much an abstraction from human experience as any isotropic 
plain.”  
Numerous developments within cognitive science, cognitive and affective neuroscience, and 
social neurosciencei provide a timely opportunity for geographers to shape both conceptual 
and methodological approaches to mind/brain/world interactions.  In considering this 
opportunity – as well as the potential pitfalls – this paper brings together hitherto 
fragmentary engagements between geography and the neurosciences in order to identify 
areas of commonality, tensions and potential points of departure for a proposed ‘critical 
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neuro-geography’. It is argued that whilst geographical research has often been informed by 
both a cognitive and neural perspective, there lacks a concerted effort to articulate what 
geography itself can contribute to critical political debates around ‘brain culture’ as a social 
formation, which refers to the place of neuroscience in society and its specific manifestation 
in policy and diverse fields of social practice. Fundamental to these debates, it is argued, is 
the relative extent to which the brain, mind and world are narrated as the locus of 
behaviour and the source of sociological and scientific explanation. 
Particular strands of contemporary cognitive science now take seriously Ley’s philosophical 
proposition that the ‘external’ world is essential to understanding human nature, thinking 
and behaviour – demonstrating a concerted diversity of approaches within the 
neurosciences.  Approaches to distributed cognition, situated cognition, cognitive ethology, 
embodied or embedded consciousness, and consciousness in action have developed to 
address the apparent dislocation of the human subject from her environmental context 
(Clark 1999; Wheeler, 2005; Kingstone et al, 2008; Noë, 2009; Robbins and Aydede 2009). 
These often conceptual debates have been complemented by recent technological 
developments which can take experimentation out of laboratory settings. These include 
‘real-world’ or mobile neuroimaging technologies such as mobile EEGs 
(electroencephalograms) (McDowell et al, 2013), and wearable biosensors/‘affective 
wearables’ which can amongst other things provide proxy measures for various emotional 
states (Picard and Healy 1997). The emergence of social neuroscience has also been a 
significant step-change in contemporary neuroscience research. Social neuroscience has 
been concerned with outlining the role of neural systems in explaining information 
processing and – by extension – human behaviour (Cacioppo, 2002: 3). Most famously this 
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approach has identified the ‘mirror neuron’, said to be the neural source of empathy, 
intersubjective understanding and thereby, sociality (Ramachandran, cited in Rose and Abi-
Rached, 2013: 146).  In parallel with the now widely accepted placticity of the brain, 
referring to the capacity of the brain to change biologically as a result of experience, there 
has thus been a rapid increase in interest in the social and environmental contexts of brain 
development. At the same time, there has been increased interest in the particular 
mechanisms by which this social and physical world might ‘get inside’ and shape the brain 
through emotional arousal and response. Since the 1990s, the advent of affective 
neuroscience which studies the physiology of emotion, including the neural circuitry of 
positive and negative affects (Davidson and Sutton, 1995) and the role of embodied 
emotions in decision making (Damasio et al, 1990) is certainly relevant to debates 
surrounding the ‘affective turn’ in geography (Thien, 2005; Anderson and Harrison 2006; 
Thrift 2008; Barnett 2008; Pile 2010; Papoulias and Callard, 2010)). 
These neuroscientific developments, in addition to the resurgence of the behavioural 
sciences are not solely epistemological, disciplinary or methodological concerns; they have 
political and policy implications in a variety of social spheres which a handful of geographers 
have begun to investigate. These include: the role of ‘neuroeducation’ and brain-based 
teaching and learning in schooling and child development (Kraftl, 2013; Gagen, 2015; Pykett, 
2012, Pykett and Disney, 2015); behavioural economics and neuroeconomics within 
financial decision-making and corporate management tactics (Clark, 2011; McDowell 2011; 
Pykett, 2013; Pykett and Enright 2016);  behavioural science approaches to transport 
planning and climate change (Barr and Prillwitz, 2014; Yalachkov et al., 2014); and the rise of 
behavioural public policy targeting the pre-cognitive realm as a technique of ‘neuroliberal’ 
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governance (Jones et al. 2013; Whitehead et al., 2017). We might therefore identify 
something of a ‘neural turn’ in human geography. For some this indicates an embrace of the 
neurobiological and neuromolecular style of thought as a means by which to re-materialise 
a more embodied and affective geography (e.g. McCormack 2007). Others have set out to 
critically address the constitutive effects of neuroscience itself, for instance in Davies’ 
research on the dangers of reductionism in neuroscience and genetics (Davies, 2010); and 
the evolution of ‘brain culture’ (Pykett, 2015).  Felicity Callard has contributed more than 
any to the establishment of both critical neuroscience and psychoanalytic geography 
perspectives on a range of phenomena including the brain ‘at rest’, mental health and 
bioethics, and the body in social theory (e.g. Callard 2006; Papoulias and Callard, 2010; 
Callard and Margulies 2011). Fitzgerald and Callard 2014 have also identified the novel 
theoretical approaches which might be advanced for crossing sociocultural and 
neurobiological research divides. As an interesting counterpoint to the aforementioned 
movements of cognitive scientists beyond laboratory settings, Callard and Fitzgerald (2015) 
have shifted sociological and geographical attention to the physical and conceptual spaces 
of the neuroscience laboratory itself. It is my intention in this paper to build on these 
emerging currents of thought, but to articulate a specifically geographical engagement with 
developments in the cognitive and neurosciences, with particular attention to implications 
for political agency and social practice. 
The paper is organised around identifying and proposing common ground for research on 
the cognitive sciences, neurosciences and geography, as well as highlighting the potential 
conflicts that such a project signifies. The first section broadly identifies how geographical 
concepts have been dealt with in cognitive science and neuroscience, providing a synthesis 
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of geographical trends in contemporary cognitive science.  This section draws on 9 in depth 
qualitative interviews conducted with UK-based academic cognitive scientists (including 
neuroscientists), a behavioural economist and a bio-ethicist between June and December 
2013. The interviews explored potential synergies between geography and contemporary 
cognitive science, not yet identified in any published literature. They provided an 
opportunity to articulate these synergies in lay language and to reflect on the broad 
geographical assumptions of practicing cognitive scientists within a rapidly evolving field.ii. 
The second section offers insights into some of the ways in which geographers have 
historically engaged with neuroscience and cognitive science, drawing particular attention 
to the novel political challenges posed by human geography’s more recently identified 
‘neural turn’.  The discussion demonstrates the need for geographers to advance 
understandings of the rationale for and unintended consequences of a global appeal to 
neuroscientific explanation within public policy and practice.    
This policy enthusiasm for neuroscientific and behavioural science insights has been global 
in reach (e.g. Dolan et al., 2010; van Bavell et al., 2013; White House, 2013; World Bank, 
2015). It is at play in contemporary governance strategies which are informed by 
behavioural science, and has been manifest in different spheres of practice including in 
education, work, parenting discourse, wellbeing policies, happiness economics, health and 
social care, criminal justice, architecture and marketing (Royal Society, 2011; Pykett, 2015; 
Whitehead et al., 2017). In its account of what a ‘critical neuro-geography’ might offer, the 
paper argues that analysis of the situatedness of subjectivity is essential for unpacking the 
political implications of neuroscience and cognitive science research as they are transferred 
from laboratory experimentation to inform policy and practice (though the boundaries of 
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the laboratory are being blurred, as the paper will explore). Exploring the situatedness of 
subjectivity provides a substantive grounds for establishing dialogue with cognitive and 
neuroscientists to problematize and enrich dominant understandings of human 
consciousness, behaviour and action in ways which are sensitive to existing spatial 
inequalities, social differences, relationships between different scales and issues of power 
and governance. 
 
Geographical trends in the neurosciences 
Cognitive scientists have not, to my knowledge, engaged with geographical literatures, apart 
from a few papers which refer to geographical information systems (e.g. Louwerse and 
Zvaan, 2009). Yet geographical concepts are frequently implicitly adopted by cognitive 
scientists and neuroscientists, including within debates around the value of ‘localization’ of 
cognitive phenomena, to processes of spatial and environmental perception (including the 
importance of situations in determining behavioural responses), and distributed, embodied 
accounts of attention and cognitioniii.  Taking these three broad geographical trends as 
starting points, this section outlines some of the geographical assumptions debated within 
contemporary cognitive science and neuroscientific research in order to sketch out the 
future potential for a more substantive engagement between geography and the 
neurosciences.  
Localization and brain geography 
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‘Mapping the brain’ has arguably been one of the main achievements and endeavours of 
neuroscience over the past 150 years, although the value and politics of this mere ‘brain 
geography’ has been questioned by neuroscientists themselves (Taylor 2012: 34). 
Neurologist, David Ferrier provided some of the first maps of brain function in the 1870s 
from animal experimentation and work with criminals and in Victorian mental asylums (Rose 
and Abi-Rached, 2013: 64).  Others had already begun to define the central components and 
structures of the brain, through the identification of the neuron by Santiago Ramón y Cajal, 
in the 1890s, and early explorations of neural networks. These insights have had lasting 
effects, for instance, within recent ongoing efforts to map neural connections under the 
rubric of Connectomics (Sporns et al., 2005).  The establishment of the disciplines of 
neuroanatomy, neurobiology and neurochemistry during the first half of the 20th Century 
(Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 32), and later innovations in neuroimaging techniques have 
concentrated the imperative to search for particular sensory and motor functions within 
specific brain regions or locales, and to identify cognitive processes strictly with the 
biological, chemical and physiological features of the brain.  fMRI technologies and EEG 
methods, amongst others, have enabled neuroscientists to produce visual maps of the 
brains of living organisms including the human brain, further enhancing the quest for 
cerebral localization.  
As one would expect, cognitive neuroscience is not a univocal venture; there is debate over 
the value, accuracy and contextual transferability of brain localization within neuroscience 
in general and neuroimaging research in particular (e.g. Brett et al., 2002). The cognitive 
neuroscientists interviewed recognized the specific scalar assumptions made through 
neuroimaging research or research on narrowly defined facets of human perception, 
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memory, attention or behaviour.   While they might have been indebted to advances in 
neuroimaging techniques, they were equally cautious of their seductive appeal and aware of 
the limitations of the findings afforded by such methods: 
“So when the scanners first became sort of usable for cognitive neuroscientists it 
was, like, you know, a kid in a candy shop, you just didn’t know what to do first.  And 
then a few years later, that was starting to be viewed as, sort of, brain geography, in 
a sense, you know, like OK that area’s active and this area’s active, but the brain 
never works by activating one area, it’s always a composite.” Cognitive 
Neuroscientist A, interviewed June 2013. 
Identifying the restricted view of brain localisation, one neuroscientist warned against the 
over-specialisation associated with career trajectories in neuroimaging, highlighting a 
certain occularcentrism within neuroscience which can narrow research focus and 
overemphasise the explanatory purchase of ‘the brain’: 
“Most people that specialise will miss the big picture, yes because the brain… 
because they just focus on their little topic… some people will say there are modules 
in the brain and each module is specialised in a specific stimuli type or specific 
processing type and we can know that and we can investigate that.  Then they’re just 
zooming into that region and try to understand it, but I think the paper [we wrote] 
was, kind of, saying by saying that you’re already giving an answer to…which you, 
you know.  They already presume their answer...” Cognitive Neuroscientist B, 
interviewed September 2013, emphasis added. 
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The methodological presumptions of brain localization here are reminiscent of what Gillian 
Rose (1995: 762) famously described as the “dominant masculine subject position in the 
West” associated with spatial mastery, control and surveillance. Whilst Rose was critiquing 
the spatial distancing achieved by visualised space, here we see that ‘zooming in’ can 
equally serve to obscure the power relations and scientific protocols implicated in localized 
brain visualizations. Such visualizations prescribe human subjectivity and narrow the 
available scope and scale of explanation available to cognitive and neuroscientists. 
In contrast, a social neuroscientist did not believe that localization should be considered a 
problem, as long as this is complemented by a more holistic analysis of the brain and is 
proportionate to the complexity of the behaviour being studied: 
“Well I mean I don’t think there’s anything fundamentally wrong. It’s clear from 
studies in humans and animals that there is a localisation of function in the brain. 
That’s not really a debate in my mind but it’s certainly not as simple as region x does 
this and region y does this, functions appear to be distributed in networks and we 
are not at the point where we fully understand how all of that works, especially for 
the more complex kind of behaviours that I’m interested in like social behaviour.” 
Social Neuroscientist C, interviewed June 2013. 
And yet it is clear that the same neuroscientists approach the brain as the ultimate source of 
our behaviour, and tend towards self-avowedly reductionist accounts of human activity 
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which are necessary limited in terms of their scale of explanation to the brain as an engine 
of both behaviour and consciousness: 
“because ultimately the mind does arise from the brain, and the brain produces 
behaviour and you know the contents of the mind, emotions, cognition are what we 
sort of experience as being causal for behaviour”. Social Neuroscientist C, 
interviewed June 2013. 
“I’m a reductionist so I don’t think that there’s anything different about my thinking 
about politics than it’s thinking about reaching for my cup of coffee, except it just 
may involve many more steps of reasoning” Cognitive Neuroscientist A, interviewed 
June 2013. 
These remarks suggest that there remains a residual adherence to some quite reductionist 
ideas about localisation and thinking within cognitive science. More ecological approaches 
which consider the brain in situ and in relation to their environment address this 
reductionism, as the following sections explore. 
Spatial and environmental perception 
The ecological approach to psychology has a long history. From the 1940s, psychologists 
such as Kurt Lewin, Roger Barker and Herbert Wright argued that the environment should 
be considered as the primary determinant of behaviour and developed ‘psychological-habit 
maps’ to demonstrate this process (Wicker, 1979, cited in Pykett, 2015: 48). Through their 
observations of behavioural patterns in particular settings, such researchers set out to 
establish the environmental causes of behaviours rather than reduce social problems to 
11 
 
Author version      © CC BY Creative Commons license 
 
individual pathologies.  But their research was not adopted by mainstream psychology, 
which has long been concerned with a more spatially-bounded interest in environmental 
perception. Most psychologists continued to conceptualise the environment as an 
immediate and literal phenomenon rather than as a multi-layered and multi-scalar 
ecological system in which behaviour was shaped.  
 
This proximate sense of environmental or spatial perception was integral to the 
establishment of early modern psychology in the late 1800s. Writing in the 1870s, Hermann 
von Helmholtz was one of the first to adopt natural science methods to study the physics of 
the mind – in distinct contrast to Kant’s account of the mind as normatively separate from 
nature (Hatfield, 2003: viii). Helmholtz’s empirical psychology underpins contemporary 
cognitive science conceptions of how the exterior world ‘gets inside’ the mind through 
processes of attention, perception, memory and learning.  It is also reflected in the assertion 
by famous scientists and philosophers that consciousness is reducible to neural processes 
(Francis Crick; Patricia Churchland, cited in Noë, 2009: 5; 189n). Spatial perception remains a 
research priority within cognitive science, incorporating the visual, auditory and 
sensorimotor aspects of human interactions with their immediate and proximate 
environment.  While this may provide important insights in terms of the particular actions 
being studied, the implications for complex forms of social and interactive behaviour are 
less well developed.   As one cognitive neuroscientist described, their research on attention 
was specifically functional, proximate and immediate. Consequently the validity of adopting 
the same approach for addressing the use of a coffee cup as for political thought becomes 
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“So in particular my interest is in attention, which is a process of, you know, as it’s 
colloquially defined of focusing on a particular input source so, you know, in this 
room now there’s lots of different visual stimuli, there’s different auditory stimuli so 
attention is then a property of the brain that allows you to concentre on one 
particular source of many different inputs, so you can expect something to occur 
over there and you can focus your attention to that source, or you can be wanting to 
focus on the auditory modality versus the visual modality.  And then that intersects 
in, so the information processing stream with what we call working memory, which 
is that sort of very brief storage of information that you're acting on at that 
particular moment in time” Cognitive Neuroscientist A, interviewed June 2013. 
Meanwhile, studies of environmental perception have developed much more in concert 
between psychologists and geographers since the 1980s, but have also remained rather 
wedded to the micro-scale of human-environment interaction, as explored in the section on 
‘Human-environment interactions’ below.   
Distributed and embodied cognition 
A third field of development in cognitive science which partly reflects the same emphasis on 
the materiality of the mind is the area of distributed, embodied, extended or situated 
cognition. As with notions of spatial and environmental perception, there is a shared 
concern for understanding human-environment interaction. But unlike the endeavours of 
localization and brain geography, it considers cognition itself more as an ecological system 
distributed between the organ of the brain, the mind and body of the person and the socio-
technical environment than as property internal to the cranium. Philosopher Andy Clark 
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(1999) has recounted a movement within cognitive science towards embodied accounts of 
the mind in response to the persistent mind-body dualisms pursued by much psychological 
and neuroscientific research. Others have focussed on the anatomical specificity of human 
vision and its relation to the environment (e.g. Proffitt 2006), on the relationship between 
human intelligence and context (Sternberg and Wagner, 1994) and on cognition as a 
dynamic “brain-body-environment system” always oriented towards specific actions 
(Wheeler, 2005: 11). Clark has noted the restricted spatial imagination of narrowly 
materialistic accounts of the brain as: “the space of the inner neural machine, divorced from 
the wider world which then enters the story only via the hygienic gateways of perception 
and action” (Clark 1999: 5). Such authors have promoted an alternative cognitive science 
where “[t]he mind itself […] is best understood as the activity of an essentially situated 
brain: a brain at home in its proper bodily, cultural and environmental niche” (Clark, 1999: 
5). 
Evidence for this strand of thinking within cognitive science is found in studies which, for 
instance, challenge the ‘input-processing-output’ model of human cognition, showing 
instead that “daily agent-environment interactions” often do not require full inner 
representations of the perceptual scene, can rely instead on motor routines, and that 
actions themselves play a crucial role in cognitive processes (Churchland et al., 1994 cited in 
Clark, 1999: 8).  Clark notes how this account recollects the interactivist notion of 
‘affordances’ provided by ecological psychologist, J.J. Gibson, whereby objects or 
environmental conditions offer up certain courses of action for people.  
14 
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The idea of affordances was helpfully described by one of the neuroscientists interviewed, 
whose research involved designing a computer-assisted environment to support stroke 
patients with executing everyday life tasks such as making a cup of tea.  Coasters were 
designed to sense what the patient was doing and feed this information back into a dynamic 
system which would alert the person on how to complete the task.  Neuroscientific methods 
and eye-tracking devices were used to understand how young people versus stroke patients 
looked at objects and made errors in object selection: 
“so there is coaster on the mug, there is coaster on the kettle, there is coasters on 
the milk jar, there are coasters all over the place.  So, these coasters send 
information to a computer and in addition, we’re using, kind of, X-box connection to 
basically record what’s happening with your upper limb and all this information is 
fed into a computer to identify what you actually did.  Did you add tea bag?  Did you 
add sugar?  Did you add water?  Did you boil the water?  Then, the computer 
basically tracks what you’ve done and what you should have done and what you are 
doing.  Then based on that, gives you a feedback, ‘Oh you forgot to boil the water.  
Please boil the water.  You didn’t add a teabag, you didn’t add sugar.’” Cognitive 
Neuroscientist B, interviewed September 2013. 
 
This suggests that some cognitive neuroscientists – not necessarily by intention – seem to 
be adopting a dynamic, embodied and distributed sense of cognition, here in the case of 
translational health research.  Just how far they would stretch this sense of distributed 
cognition, both metaphorically and literally, would be an interesting starting point for a 
critical neuro-geography.  
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Why do brain localization, theories of spatial and environmental perception and a 
distributed and embodied account of cognition matter beyond the disciplinary confines of 
cognitive science? These approaches tend in the final analysis towards a reductionist notion 
of space and context limited respectively to the brain, the perceptual environment or 
proximate situation, and action-oriented taskscapes. Their value to normative and political 
discussions (rather than coffee cups), might at first glance appear far-fetched.  Up to this 
point this paper has provided little sign, for instance, of any potential confluence between 
concepts of space perception deployed in cognitive science and notions of ‘spatiality’, 
including concerns of spatial difference, spatial justice, spatial inequality, or spatial politics 
already well established in human geography. Yet it is precisely a set of distinctly political 
claims which have been advanced through geographical engagements with the cognitive 
and neurosciences. The next section therefore considers the broader implications of the 
aforementioned trends by offering a synoptic review of three trajectories in the 
development of human geography where engagements between cognitive science, 
neuroscience and geography have been central. 
 
Geographical engagements with the cognitive and neurosciences 
There has already been substantial critique of the cognitive and neurosciences 
bysociologists, cultural theorists, philosophers, psychologists, science and technology 
studies and medical humanities scholars, who have tried to re-situate the human subject in 
their behavioural ‘milieu’ (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). Specifically they have identified the 
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geo-historical circumstances of the emergence of ‘cerebral subjectivity’ (Ortega and Vidal, 
2009) and addressed the apparent ‘neuromania’ characterising popular culture (Legrenzi 
and Ulmita, 2011; Pickersgill et al., 2011; Thornton, 2011; Choudhury and Slaby, 2012; 
Canter and Turner, 2014; DeVos and Pluth, 2016; Pitts-Taylor 2016). In a more ‘embracing’ 
fashion, neurophenomenology and neuroanthropology have emerged as approaches which 
use neuroscientific frameworks and methods to explain experience and consciousness (in 
the case of neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996)), and the evolution of culture (in the case 
of neuroanthropology (Duque et al, 2010)). Adding to this field, as reflected in the section 
on ‘Contextual rationalities’ below, geographers have begun to take a critical interest in the 
contemporary social and political significance of neuroscience. They have also analysed 
‘brain culture’, referring to the influence of neuroscientific insights on a broad spectrum of 
social practices, processes of subjectification, and public policies (Fitzgerald and Callard, 
2014; Gagen, 2015; Pykett 2015). In this section I consider what geographers’ historical 
engagements with cognitive science teach us about the extent to which a future neuro-
geography might embrace or critique the neural turn evident within the social sciences and 
humanities.   
Three areas of human geographic thought are summarised here, selected for what they can 
each distinctively tell us about integrating cognitive and neuroscience research into our 
social and spatial explanations of subjectivity, behaviour and contextiv. The dynamics of 
human-environment interactions (informed by behavioural geography and environmental 
psychology), affective architectures (as conceived by non-representational theory (NRT)) 
and contextual rationalities (the focus of Foucauldian approaches) are elaborated as setting 
off points for a critical neuro-geography which is informed by but not indebted to cognitive 
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and neuroscience insights. The novelty of this approach is to combine (a) the 
problematisation and enrichment of the geographical concepts deployed and developed in 
cognitive and neuroscience, with (b) a critical analysis of assumptions concerning political 
agency found within the global enthusiasm for neuroscientifically-informed public policy 
and everyday practice, as geographical trends themselvesv.   
 
Human-environment interactions 
As already noted, the study of spatial and environmental perception was central to the 
development of environmental and ecological psychology as branches of cognitive science. 
Within geography, behavioural approaches became an integral part of the discipline’s 
history from the 1960s. Scholars such as Wolpert, and Golledge and Stimson (cited in Pykett, 
2015: 45) explored the relationship between images, revealed perceptions and behaviour, 
and modelled the way in which minds process information about the environment. Amongst 
their achievements were their promotion of space as more than simply a surface on which 
human behaviours were mechanistically played out and their problematisation of ‘rational 
economic man’ through developing notions of bounded rationality.  Yet blind spots in 
behavioural geography were being widely criticised by the 1980s: Marxist geographers 
argued they that offered no real explanation for the structural contexts of human 
behaviour; humanists felt they disregarded the cultural mediation of human consciousness 
(Cox, 1981; Ley, 1981 cited in Pykett, 2015: 45). From a psychoanalytic perspective, they 
were criticised for their gender blindness, for decoupling the mind and body and for 
providing no conception of the situated processes of subjectification (Pile, 1996).  As such, 
there could be little appreciation within the behavioural approach of the diversity of human 
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perception and experience, which limits the potential of the behaviourists to appreciate 
both the hierarchical categorisation (and governance) of different experiences of 
consciousness, and what is now termed ‘neuro-diversity’; valuing and seeking equality for a 
range of neurological differences in terms of naturally occurring genetic variation.  
Despite these significant criticisms, explorations of behavioural geographers of theories of 
cognition have been developed by the contemporary field of environmental psychology, an 
increasingly influential field of study which informs public policy debates concerning the 
interrelations between the environment, mind and behaviour. Devine-Wright and Clayton 
(2010: 267) have argued that environmental psychology should better re-connect the self 
and the social by attending to the dynamic relationship between identity, cognition, affect 
and behaviour, as well as the structural conditions in which people might live more 
sustainable lives.  The hitherto limited engagements of environmental psychologists with 
issues of social and spatial context pose particular limitations for attempts to analyse the 
productive effects of cognitive science as applied in policy, which mobilises these very 
environmental psychological knowledges in order to shape citizens’ behaviours. In seeking 
to render measurable psychological ‘traits’, attitudes, and values, and in its ambitions to 
operationalise workable models of behavioural change,  what gets left out of many such 
studies is consideration of the specific mechanisms through which human subjectivity is 
itself socially and spatially produced in specific contexts. These blind-spots also plague the 
behavioural turn in public policy and governance evident in the work of ‘nudge units’ now 
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Affective architectures 
Since the late 1990s, human geography has seen a discernible ‘neural turn’ through the 
development of Non-Representational Theory (NRT), which is partly founded on 
neuroscientific explanations of human action (Korf, 2008). At the same time geography has 
become more sensitive to materiality, the agency of non-human actors and to bodily 
practices in general.  NRT has drawn on distributed accounts of embodied cognition offered 
by cognitive science, and in the environmental affordances of particular spatial 
arrangements (Thrift 2008; Anderson and Harrison, 2010: 7). NRT argues that practices, 
events and relations are best understood outside of systems of representation (structures of 
writing, language, conscious expression, interpretation, social constructs). This approach is 
‘bio-social’ in that it proposes that the individual, atomistic, rational self is a modernist 
fiction and Cartesian error, and that we need to develop a new performative style of 
thinking concerning human nature and the subject. The influence of neuroscience can be 
traced within Deleuzian strands of NRT in geography, as evidenced by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s materialist and embodied conceptualisation of the brain as a site of the 
“resolution of forces” within which the radical multiplicity of the world is selectively 
perceived, abstracted and creates new possibilities for thought (Watson, 1998: 29; 34). For 
geographers such as McCormack, for instance, an attention to the molecular, including 
neurochemistry is pertinent to developing a human geography which attends to the way in 
which thinking itself “emerges from a sensible field”, is material, and constituted in dynamic 
relation with the world and the non-human (McCormack 2007: 365).  There are specific 
traces of affective neuroscience evident in this strand of human geography, with reference 
to Joseph Le Doux, Francisco Varela and Antonio Damasio being prominent. Yet there is 
surprisingly little discussion of cognitive neuroscience and social neuroscience in this work. 
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This selective interest in certain strands of neuroscience, as Papoulias and Callard (2010) 
have pointed out, explains why the NRT approach is able to claim a neuroscientific basis for 
its generative or performative politics within fields of seemingly infinite possibilities whilst 
apparently ignoring the often explicit determinism and reductionism of other neuroscience 
strands, as we shall see later. 
One of the founding tenets of NRT is based in contemporary neuroscientific accounts of 
personhood; that human action precedes cognition; put simply, we act before we think.  It is 
this insight that leads Thrift to assert a radically new spatial politics of affect based on the 
frailty of decision-making and psychological challenges to the illusory notion of free will: 
‘Wundt was able to show that consciousness takes time to construct; we are ‘late for 
consciousness’ (Damasio 1999: 127). That insight was subsequently formalized in the 
1960s by Libet using the new body recording technologies. He was able to show 
decisively that an action is set in motion before we decide to perform it: the ‘average 
readiness potential’ is about 0.8 seconds, although cases as long as 1.5 seconds have 
been recorded. In other words ‘consciousness takes a relatively long time to build, 
and any experience of it being instantaneous must be a backdated illusion’” (Thrift, 
2004: 67). 
Thrift thus takes up Libet’s findings to argue that the “constantly moving pre-conscious 
frontier...is highly political”; a sphere of “microbiopolitics” (Thrift, 2004: 67). Because it has 
become visible to science, this moment between action and consciousness awareness can 
be targeted and operated on by various actors in order to produce particular political 
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responses. This is particularly the case in urban design, which Thrift identifies as a new 
political field in which affective responses can be effectively pre-programmed and as the 
broad means by which affective architectures can be engineered (Thrift, 2004: 68).  In 
positing the post-human subject as the key actor (that we can never be separated from our 
environments), NRT points towards the “insufficiency of argument” as a political modus 
operandi (Thrift, 2004: 71). The political subject posed here is diminished to a figure 
drowned out by its affective capacities and pre-figurative neural drivers, who is fooled by 
their own post-hoc rationalisations for action. This neurally-inflected citizen, determined by 
their biology to act in non-rational ways, is susceptible to affective forms of manipulation. 
NRT and its related spatial politics of affect have not entered the discipline of human 
geography without criticism.  For some, the non-representational approach is based on a 
highly deterministic attack on the rational modernist subject, which relies on the naïve 
naturalism of presuming that localized brain processes cause human action rather than on 
convincing critiques of this false universality (Korf, 2008). This is relevant here insofar as 
brain culture and its associated global policies and everyday practices rely heavily on the 
claim that we can no longer be understood as rational actors. For Korf (2008: 716), there is 
no space left by NRT to address the contingency of subjectivity (its relation to context) 
rather than its determinacy.  Others have broadly challenged its reliance on partial 
narratives of neuroscience and cognitive science, which have been anchored to a biological 
account of personhood and thinking which remains deterministic and evolutionarily ‘set in’ 
rather than shaped by context-specific processes of embodied subjectivity (Papoulias and 
Callard, 2010: 34). The political insights offered by NRT are further problematized by 
debates within cognitive neuroscience and beyond around the validity of Libet’s original 
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experiments and assumptions. Tallis (2011: 247) points out that Libet’s inattention to 
context led him to the flawed and troubling denial of free will, precisely because the 
experimental set-up itself reduced the concept of free will  or human action to a narrow 
bodily movement (flexing the wrist) which could then be measured in relation to brain 
activity. “It is no surprise” observes Tallis “that we cannot find free will in this isolated 
moment in a laboratory, if we treat it as an isolated moment” (2011: 250).  
Geographers have expressed substantial scepticism towards the political ramifications of 
NRT’s engagements with neuroscience, in particular its insistence of the primacy of affect 
over emotion, rationality, intention and deliberation (Barnett, 2008; Pile, 2010). As such 
they have criticised how NRT celebrates the creative politics of affect (the radical possibility 
of the biological brain-world continuum to generate new concepts, thought and action), 
whilst conversely decrying the susceptibility of affects to be engineered by the powerful 
(Pile, 2010: 12). It has been argued that both Thrift and cultural theorist, William Connolly 
(2002), who is referenced at length by Thrift, render a version of neuropolitics as the 
manipulation of affects by mood manipulators and affective architects. The very possibility 
of thought is said to be scripted by culture (Connolly, 2002: 94), and only a Deleuzian-qua-
neuroscientific account of the layered “geology of thought” (Connolly 2002: 90) is sufficient 
to expose the “affective organization of thought and judgment” (Connolly 2002: 94).  
Barnett (2008: 189) draws on pragmatist philosophy to argue against this ontological 
layering of the practical priming of action by an environment to which the body/brain is 
attuned, as preceding (and prioritised over) language, intention, representation and 
expressive rationality. In other words, Barnett (2008: 190) rejects NRTs notions of the 
affective governance of public space and its suspicion of both engineered affects and 
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deliberative forms of democracy. Instead, he points us towards work in political science 
which has long established the central role of affect and non-rational feelings in political 
deliberation and encountering others. Unlike the apparent universalism of NRT, it can be 
argued that this kind of approach better accounts for social difference and retains a space 
for expressed argumentation and justification – as Barnett (2008: 190) terms it, the “giving 
and asking for reasons”. 
Yet while we may want to question the “layer-cake interpretation” and “logical geography” 
of human action provided by NRT, a critical neuro-geography might well build on Thrift’s 
important search for the ‘whereabouts’ of subjectivity. As such, geographers might focus on 
“sites at which behaviour was modified, that is with the moment, the location, and the 
mechanism through which difference or invention was produced” (Thrift, 2008: 84). In this 
way, the more spatial engagements of NRT with theories of distributed cognition (Thrift, 
2008) could act as a valuable challenge to the tendency within some strands of 
neuroscience to locate human consciousness and thereby, human subjectivity narrowly in 
the brain. This is also evidenced in Anderson and Harrison’s (2010: 286) nuanced reading of 
the scalar imaginations and political activism of Guattari, which are in stark contrast to the 
emphasis on micropolitics and cultivating techniques of the self, including meditation, 
mystical, body and ritual practices proposed by Connolly (2002: 100-102) and Thrift (2008: 
65-6). As the following section argues, a concern with the whereabouts/situatedness of 
subjectivity, the scalar politics of the cognitive, social and affective neurosciences, together 
with Foucauldian accounts of the rationalities of action and disposition of things offers 
productive common ground for geography and neuroscience.  
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Contextual rationalities 
Within recent geographical thought there appears to be an ongoing impasse between 
approaches focussed on the non-representational, pre-cognitive domain of affective 
practices, and those centred on the discursive contexts in which bodies and subjects are 
socially differentiated as gendered, classed, racialized, (dis)abled, sexualised, aged and so on 
(e.g. Tolia-Kelly, 2006). Foucauldian analyses of discourse have had a sustained influence on 
geographical critiques relating to the truth claims of various forms of psychological, 
cognitive science or neuroscience knowledge, and their deployment through techniques of 
governing, ethical practices of self-making and subject-formation. In this sense, for a critical 
neuro-geography, cognitive science is more the object of study than the means by which to 
account for human-environment relations.  For Gagen (2006; 2015) and Pykett (2013; 2015), 
Foucault’s work foregrounds the constitutive role of discursive rationalities in shaping the 
(unequal) contexts in which human action and subjectivity are shaped, emphasising 
interplays of power and knowledge through what he famously termed the ‘conduct of 
conduct’.  
Rather than denoting a proximate, material ecology of perception and action, the notion of 
context here refers to specific spaces, the discursive qualities of those spaces as cultural 
milieux, and the ways in which those spaces are always already shaped by governmental 
practices. In this light, context can be understood as a geo-historical epoch which renders 
certain courses of action and subject positions possible. Gagen, for instance, emphasises 
how child development theories and child-study tests in American schools at the turn of the 
20th Century signified the absorption of psychological knowledge into spatial practices, in 
ways which conflated the moral, mental and physical attributes of children: 
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“As interiority was systematically brought within the realm of science and 
reconceptualised as material, the traditional metonymic connection between 
physicality and morality dissolved into a new material relationship between the self 
and its numerical existence” (Gagen, 2006: 829). 
More recently, she has described how contemporary interest in neuroscientifically informed 
emotional education in UK schools reimagines education in light of the demands of the 
neoliberal workplace and its demand for social and emotional ‘competencies’ (Gagen 2015). 
Similarly, Pykett (2015) has highlighted how a brain-based spatial rationality has informed 
both the ‘neuroarchitectural’ design of schools and the adoption of neuroeducational 
methods, in a way which reaffirms an agenda of economic competitiveness, 
responsibilization and self-optimization.  
Rationalities, in turn, refer to the truths, thoughts or knowledges which imply the aims of 
government (Huxley, 2006: 772), where a “regime of rationality” serves to “found, justify 
and provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing things” (Foucault, 1991 in 
Huxley, 2006: 771). In this way, Callard and Fitzgerald (2015: 99-100) have described how a 
Foucauldian notion of power as a technique of categorization also shapes efforts to foster 
interdisciplinary engagements between social scientists and neuroscientists – warning of the 
“[r]hetorics of reciprocation and mutuality” which underpin such efforts despite clear 
disciplinary hierarchies in terms of both financial power and epistemological currency. 
Foucauldian geography can help us to understand the regulation and governance of human 
subjectivity at both the scale of the body (anatomo-politics) and whole populations 
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(biopolitics) in ways that do appreciate fleshy materialities, vital bodies, the non-textual, 
resistive practices and embodied difference (Philo, 2012: 499; 505).  This work reminds us 
that all human action is governed through the arrangements of space, the orchestration of 
relationships, the management of populations and cultivation of the self. This fact does not 
imply that we are all somehow being manipulated but rather that we live in social 
environments shaped by history and geography in which the liberal conception of autonomy 
is an Enlightenment construct (Crawford, 2015: 120). In this sense we are compelled to 
consider the socially and spatially uneven and unequal landscapes within which human 
action takes place rather than to endlessly cogitate on the possibility or otherwise of 
autonomous thought. 
One way in which the contextual rationalities approach can be developed is through an 
emphasis on the politics and economics of attention. This could pave a path through the 
above debates in order to advance a critical neuro-geography fit to communicate the 
potential value of geographical research to cognitive and neuroscientists (since 
interdisciplinary conversations have been decidedly one-way thus far).  Geographers (e.g. 
Scott 2008) have recently explored the terrain of ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Lazzarato 1996; 
Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007; Vercellone, 2005) in order to understand the political 
significance of contemporary shifts towards a knowledge economy, state concerns to 
improve cultural and psychological capital, and the forms of immaterial, affective and 
emotional labour implied therein.  So too they have considered the “attention economy” 
implied by these shifts which has been re-organised by the cultural and technological 
characteristics of the contemporary Western informational, mediated and digital era 
(Crogan and Kinsley, 2012). Geography can provide an integrative analysis of the contextual 
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rationalities of these perceptual environments which is at once sensitive to embodied 
cognition and the longer-running geo-historical shifts implicated by the governing of 
subjectivity and the conduct of conduct.   
There are emergent examples of what this kind of analysis looks like. For instance, Matthew 
Hannah (2013: 235) – informed by Foucauldian interpretations and a politicized 
phenomenological philosophy – has provided an original historical account of the 
emergence of “constructions of modern perception” in order to critique the uneven 
landscapes of attention shaped by contemporary capitalism. Unlike Connolly’s neuropolitics, 
which focuses on the apparent crisis of distraction and the need for cultivating meditative 
techniques of the self, Hannah concentrates on “the finite embodied availability and the 
directional selectivity of attention” (Hannah, 2013: 235, original emphasis).  He sets out a 
political economics of attention, which unlike the non-representational approach locates 
the source of political agency firmly in our subjective human capacities for deliberation and 
reflection as opposed to the neurobiological frontier between action and cognition.  His 
account is also contextualised in a specific geo-historical epoch. Similarly, Callard and 
Marguilies (2011) have examined how the state of attention itself has been colonized 
through neuroscience. They demonstrate how the ‘brain at rest’ (the so-called default or 
‘resting state’ brain which forms the contrasting baseline for neuroscientific studies of brain 
‘activity’) has been re-imagined as a productive site of industriousness, creativity, future 
strategizing and purposeful mind-wandering. As such, it is indicative of the “often 
unacknowledged isomorphism between models of the brain and models of socio-economic 
organization” Callard and Marguilies (2011: 245). 
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These arguments hint towards a further basis for productive engagement between NRT and 
Foucauldian approaches to a critical neuro-geography, where the situated subject is 
understood within both her specific ecology of attention and within particular contextual 
rationalities. In other words, this approach investigates both affective architectures and 
forms of expressive rationality, deliberation and judgment.  We might therefore study the 
role of cognitive science and neuroscientific knowledge in shaping spatial forms in two 
parallel senses. Firstly, through a consideration of the affordances of spaces, landscapes and 
environments, the necessarily finite capacities of the human body to be affected and its 
distributed sense of agency. And secondly through a sensitivity towards the power dynamics 
and ‘directional selectivity’ of attention for which understanding the historical materialisms 
and discursive formations of uneven and differentiated capitalism, as well as first-person 
expressed experiences of space are essential. The conclusion will spell out why this might 
provide useful grounds for future geographical dialogue with cognitive scientists and 
neuroscientists. 
Conclusion. For a critical neuro-geography 
 
There is by now established evidence of dialogue between behavioural scientists, cognitive 
neuroscientists and policy makers informing policy strategy. There are numerous examples 
of applications of the neuro-prefix in setting both new research agendas and in fields of 
practice as diverse as workplaces, urban design, education, criminal justice and health. Such 
is the extent of this influence that commentators have been compelled to ask searching 
questions about the political, economic and cultural ramifications of this global venture.  
Seymour and Vlaev (2012: 449) have asked: “can, and should, behavioural neuroscience 
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influence public policy?” Will Davies has asked how the appeal to psychological and 
biological explanation has been allowed to bypass moral and political debate (2015: 20). 
Others have looked at phenomena such as neuroeconomics and neuromarketing, and 
demanded to know:  “why is this form of reductionism rampant at this point of our history?” 
(Schneider and Woolgar, 2012: 185). Indeed as the paper has indicated, a significant corpus 
of neuro-criticism has emerged in response to what has been heralded as the incremental 
rise of brain culture, highlighting the potential diminution of personhood, agency and 
personal and political attention conferred by neuroscience-society relations.    
The emergence of brain culture requires scrutiny of the uses to which psychology, 
behavioural science and cognitive science have been put in framing problems and proposing 
solutions to a whole raft of social, economic and governance issues.  The paper has 
proposed that such scrutiny is enhanced by the perspective of a critical neuro-geography: an 
interdisciplinary engagement between cognitive science, neuroscience and human 
geography. This engagement draws on the critical purchase of human geography in at least 
three ways. Firstly, it examines the transferability of geographical concepts as deployed 
within the cognitive and neurosciences, in order to problematize and enrich the definitions 
and assumptions made therein. Secondly, it learns from past engagements and the degree 
to which they have embraced or problematized shared concepts and concerns, and in terms 
of their partial/selective uptake of neuroscientific insights. Thirdly, it sets out to identify and 
explain the spatially uneven effects of brain culture, taking into account the material, 
embodied and discursive contexts in which neuroscientifically-informed social practices, 
political agency and public policies are assembled, shaped and sustained. Critical neuro-
geography builds on approaches within psychology and neuroscience which have recently 
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highlighted the ways in which reflexive human experience is historically and geographically 
contingent; namely ‘critical psychology’ (Parker, 2015) and ‘critical neuroscience’ 
(Choudhury and Slaby 2012).  
A critical neuro-geography should be informed by but not indebted to neuroscience and 
cognitive science. It recognises the necessary partiality of both disciplinary perspectives, in 
terms of their accounts of human perception, attention, behaviour, subjectivity and action. 
A critical neuro-geography offers new insight into the sources of this partiality, assessing 
distinguishing features, common ground, advancing complementary approaches where 
possible, and challenging assumptions where necessary. As the first section outlined, at 
heart the disciplines of geography and neuroscience operate at different scales of 
explanation, relying on quite distinct conceptualisations of localization, scale, context, 
situation, environment, space and distributed cognition/agency.  This matters because these 
conceptualisations imply wildly contrasting explanations for contemporary social, economic 
and governance problems, and connote entirely different sources of human consciousness 
and political agency.   
The drive towards localization and brain mapping has withstood extensive criticism from 
both within and outwith the cognitive sciences, although serious differences in the validity 
of localisation, reductionism and the propensity for brain visualisations to obscure the ‘big 
picture’ are evident from the research interviews presented in this paper. This suggests that 
geographers could play a useful role in extending the research site of cognition (and 
supposed source of behaviour) along a scalar continuum from brain activity to human action 
in real-world contexts.  So too, geographers can highlight the political rationalities of 
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mapping, and both the interiorisation and spatialization of moral and political norms, as 
shown by Gagen’s work. This foregrounds the historical and geographically specific contexts 
in which human action is shaped not only by perception, attention, memory, learning, 
enaction and affective capacities – but also by enduring conditions of inequality, social 
difference and subjectification, power struggles over recognition, and spatially and socially 
uneven material and discursive capacities for action. 
Relatedly, geographers can improve the sometimes basic conceptions of ‘the environment’ 
as portrayed by researchers of spatial and environmental perception (and arguably also 
within social neuroscience). Too often ‘the environment’ is defined in this work in terms of 
the microscale attentional environment, the immediate perceptual moment, or the 
characteristics of the social group to which research subjects are immediately exposed (here 
a social group maybe by human or animal, suggesting that such an approach may be ill-
equipped to deal with complex social structures such as capitalism, for instance).  As the 
paper has outlined, recent debates in environmental psychology suggest ways for breaking 
out of the behaviourist mould by bringing issues of culture, difference and social context 
into view. In distinction, NRT approaches in geography have sought to divert attention away 
from the dynamics of cultural inscription or social construction, looking directly to 
neuroscience to highlight the importance of the pre-cognitive and affective realm in shaping 
human thought and experience.  As a branch of geography which draws most clearly from 
neuroscience, in particular from accounts of embodied/distributed cognition and 
affective/emotional neuroscience, this perspective should be taken seriously. But in looking 
to neuroscience to establish a radical political project based on the generative potential of 
the embodied brain, this approach has been criticised on several counts: firstly, for its 
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troubling attitude towards free will and its resultant foreclosure of the ethical human agent 
and practical reason; secondly, for its ambiguous account of the possibilities of subliminal 
political manipulation through affective architectures; and thirdly, for its dismissive stance 
towards the constitutive power of social and cultural representations in constituting 
differentiated subjectivity.  Indeed this venture marks some of the dangers of attempting to 
transfer concepts outside of the scientific laboratory. 
Throughout these engagements, the impetus has been to incorporate cognitive and 
neuroscience perspectives into geographical study.  By contrast, Foucauldian geographies 
have approached the neurosciences as an object of study as opposed to a means of analysis. 
As such this has arguably provided a more comprehensive demonstration of what a critical 
neuro-geography could contribute to advancing new dialogues with contemporary cognitive 
and neuroscientists.  Its potential lies in particular in how it addresses the contextual 
rationalities of human attention, perception and conduct by attending both to embodied, 
enacted notions of cognition (and pre-/non-cognition) and the broader geo-historical 
contexts in which uneven ecologies of attention are shaped, subjectivities are situated and 
people are governed – at a number of relational scales. Its interests in the role of 
neuroscientists as an epistemic community invoked in the pursuit of increasingly affective 
forms of governance provides the critical distance that marks it out from the previous 
neural turn in geographyvi.  From here, it provides new ground from which to establish 
dialogue with social neuroscientists who are yet to satisfactorily grapple with issues of social 
discourse, inequality and difference. So too it could begin to experiment methodologically 
with neurotechnologies and wearable biosensors outside of laboratory contexts in order to 
develop a more distinctly geographical perspective on the political economies of attentional 
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environments. Such a methodological innovation needs to incorporate multiple scales of 
analysis (and address the relations between them), attend to the inherent relationality 
between the social, spatial inequality and selfhood, and be mindful of the potential power 
dynamics and blind-spots conferred by rendering brains and emotions measurable and 
governable, not to mention the scientific validity of ‘uncontrolled’ real world 
experimentation.  
In sum, a critical neuro-geography offers two novel benefits in terms of understanding the 
relationship between neuroscience, society and spatiality. First it is able to accommodate 
the circularity effects of living within a brain culture in which popular discourse, global policy 
agendas and everyday practices have already been influenced by brain-based explanation – 
by situating the human subject within their scaled-up context. Secondly it provides a basis 
for empirical research on particular manifestations of brain culture which takes seriously 
both the embodied brain and the situated processes of subject formation. As such it calls on 
geographers to find new ways to investigate differentiated and embodied experience which 
will sometimes bring together and sometimes strategically hold in tension the biophysical 
and discursive elements of experience without returning to naïve mind-body dualisms. And 
it calls on cognitive and neuroscientists to take seriously the historical and geographical 
‘real-world’ contexts in which human action is shaped, the potential policy and political 
implications of their own work, the political rationalities of particular uneven spatial 
arrangements, the dispositions of things and modes of conduct, and the everyday first-
person experiences of these arrangements. Only in this way can we adequately assess the 
potential consequences of too partial explanations of the value, boundedness and purpose 
of human behaviour in the context of inequality and difference. 
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framework, neuroscience refers to the anatomical and biophysical study of the brain and nervous system. 
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iii Given the limitations of space, the present article does not consider related issues of epigenetics, which 
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occupations with cognition, rationality and consciousness. For the purposes of this paper I focus on the 
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vi But note how the notion of ‘critical distance’ has itself been problematized, by Rose and Abi-Rached (2013:8) 
who are unconvinced by the “overgeneralized critiques of ‘neuromania’ and other fundamentally defensive 
reactions from the social and human sciences”, and by Callard and Fitzgerald (2015: 44) who want to “do away 
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histories away with her all-conquering brain machine”.  
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